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Abstract 
Since 2008, a series of new regulatory initiatives have emerged to address large-scale land grabs. 
These initiatives are occurring simultaneously at multiple levels of social organization instead of 
a single, overarching institutional site. A significant portion of this activity is taking place at the 
transnational level. We suggest that transnational land governance is indicative of emerging 
shifts in the practice of governance of global affairs. We analyze such shifts by asking two 
related questions: what does land grabbing tell us about developments in transnational 
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Introduction 
 
Since 2008, a series of new regulatory initiatives and global institution-building projects have 
emerged to address large-scale land grabs. These are occurring simultaneously at multiple levels 
of social organization instead of a single, overarching institutional site. The range of actors 
operating in this web is considerable and highly diverse and we see states, multilateral 
organizations, global civil society, corporate actors, and peasant farmers engaging in and 
demanding diverse modes of governance. Taken together, these signal the emergence of what 
might be termed transnational land governance.  
 We develop four propositions about the complexity of transnational land governance that, 
in our view, have not been accorded sufficient attention in the literature on land grabbing and 
permits for a more critical study of land grabbing and global governance. The first proposition is 
that the institutional arrangements associated with US dominance and the earlier colonial period 
of land grabbing are being replaced by more complex, polycentric ones operating in an 
increasingly multipolar global political economy, rendering the previous North-South and West-
East cleavages less relevant. The second proposition is that the ideational and the material 
aspects of transnational governance are becoming more directly entangled and complex as we 
approach or surpass the Earth’s physical ability to sustain our civilization and a multiplicity of 
actors mobilize normative beliefs and scientific knowledge to address intensified resource 
challenges and land conflicts. The third proposition is that conflict and collaboration among 
states and other actors will play out through the informal complex of transnational land 
governance arrangements rather than undermining or replacing them, for instance by developing 
purely local or more formal, legalized international solutions. The fourth proposition is that the 
best chance for protecting vulnerable populations, often subject to illegal and violent 
dispossession of their land, is for concerned transnational advocacy networks and states to work 
through and seek to orchestrate the informal complex of transnational land governance towards 
social justice ends. The next section of the essay develops the theoretical aspects of the above 
questions. The following sections then examine the relevance of our propositions to land 
grabbing.  
   
Theorizing New Developments in Transnational Governance 
 
There is a widespread sense that the pace of change in global affairs is accelerating, perhaps even 
catastrophically. Scholars have made important advances in understanding the significance of 
these changes, moving us well beyond older models of international affairs such as state-centric 
realism. It is important to build on these insights from studies of global and transnational 
governance to know how best to regulate or challenge land grabbing. In this section, we draw on 
insights from existing studies to develop our four propositions.  
 
Beyond Older Colonial and Unipolar Power Relations 
 
The global financial and economic crisis that began in 2007 revealed most clearly significant 
shifts in the balance of power among key international actors. The replacement of the Group of 
Eight (G8) by the Group of Twenty (G20) at the Heads of State level and the incorporation of the 
G20’s developing country members into all the significant institutions in the international 
financial architecture marked decisively the arrival of new participants at the table of great 
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powers. This was reinforced by the damage the crisis did to the US and European economies and 
to the credibility of their economic models, and the strength displayed by other economies, such 
as China’s or Brazil’s. These shifts in the balance of power are not confined to global finance but 
demonstrable across diverse governance fields, including international trade (Narlikar and 
Tussie, 2004; Narlikar and Wilkinson 2004), climate change (Hochstetler and Viola, 2012; 
Vihma, 2011; Barros-Platiau 2010; Williams, 2005), money (Bowles and Wang, 2010), energy 
(Victor and Yeuh, 2010; Lesage, Van de Graaf and Westphal, 2010) and oceans (Suárez de 
Vivero and Rodríguez Mateos, 2010). Exceptions remain, such as emerging powers limited 
inroads at the IMF and World Bank evident in these countries’ voting shares (Wade, 2011).  
However the power shift is evident even within these institutions, as the increased prominence of 
emerging powers in foreign aid is changing the theory and practice of global development and no 
longer the exclusive remit of the North (see de Haan, 2011; Walz and Ramachadran, 2011; Tan-
Mullins, Mohan and Power, 2010; Dauvergne and Farias, 2012). This change has been called a 
‘silent revolution’ in global development (Woods, 2008). 
 Our point is not to claim that the US has been dislodged from its privileged position. 
Clearly, the US remains a dominant actor. Nevertheless the US is experiencing a relative erosion 
of power, introducing new dynamics to the global system and making possible future trajectories 
in transnational governance that may not have been imaginable previously. Consequently, talk of 
US empire or unipolarity, which had been fashionable earlier in the decade, is less useful today 
to the extent it renders invisible, or implicitly makes secondary, the power dynamics of 
multipolarity.  
 Two lessons from international relations theory for understanding mulitpolarity are clear. 
The first is that governance is likely to be more complicated with larger numbers of major 
players at the table with ever more diverse interests (see Lake, 1993). A second, discussed 
further below, is that polarity is only one among many factors that shape transnational 
governance, and other forms of power and order than the conventional state capabilities that 
theories of polarity focus on are also important. These changes are highly relevant to land 
grabbing, and lead to our first proposition: the political and economic institutions associated with 
colonialism and US unipolarity are being supplanted by a more complex set of relationships, in 
which old cleavages that separated North and South or a capitalist West and a state-centric East 
are no longer as relevant.  
 
The Ideational, the Material, and the Earth’s Limits 
 
Two quite different aspects of transnational governance have displayed increased prominence in 
recent years: its ideational and material aspects. Inspired by the ‘cultural turn’ in the social 
sciences, the increased importance of the ideational aspect is evident in a long list of theoretical 
innovations in study of international relations and global governance, including epistemic 
communities (Haas, 1999), soft power (Nye, 2005), constructivism (Wendt, 1995), post-
structuralism (de Goede, 2006), cultural political economy (Jessop, 2004), and legitimacy (Zürn, 
2004; Cashore, 2003). The increased complexity of materiality in transnational governance is 
evident in the major concerns that have assumed a higher priority in global public policy, 
including sustainable development and climate change, which reference the material limits of the 
Earth; global health issues which concern the materiality of the body; and global poverty 
alleviation, which involves material standards of living.  
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 While initially much of the focus of ideational research programs within international 
relations was on whether ideas could shape the interactions among states, it is increasingly 
urgent today to understand better the more direct power relationships between transnational ideas 
and the materiality of the Earth and its life-forms. The mediating role of states in this relationship 
can still be important. However many of these material/ideational interactions do not run through 
states, for instance when new private sector ideas like genetic engineering have direct material 
effects on the Earth and its life-forms. Risk has become increasingly important in managing the 
interactions between humans and our environment, including in specific interactions that are 
some distance from traditional centralized state policies (Aradau and Van Munster, 2007; Power, 
2007).  
 This leads to our second proposition: normative beliefs and scientific knowledge are 
important not only because they influence states, but also because they directly interact with the 
intensified resource challenges and land conflicts that accompany the Earth’s diminishing 
physical ability to sustain our civilization.  
 
The Complexity of Transnational Governance 
 
There has been a great deal of scholarly work done to illuminate the complexity of transnational 
governance.1 State principals delegate to non-state agents or intergovernmental organizations 
that they do not fully control. Business and other non-state actors produce and implement rules 
and operations that states would have provided in previous times. One theme in this literature is 
that the local, national and global interact in complex ways.  
 An emerging theme in this literature is that it is important to analyze both the autonomy 
of particular regimes or clusters of institutions and their interactions with one another. This 
contrasts, for instance, with an earlier research program on international regimes that focused on 
one regime at a time and sought to analyze its relationship with the states involved in it (Krasner, 
1982). A growing number of studies have shown that interaction among regimes and/or clusters 
of institutions is deepening and producing uncertainty for actors (Raustialia and Victor, 2004). 
Heightened uncertainty may lead to new cooperation and coordination problems, such as 
constraining or chilling effects by one institution on another (Conca, 2000; Eckersley, 2004; 
Axelrod 2011 in Oberthur and Stokke; Veggeland and Borgen, 2005; Oberthür and Gehring, 
2006) or ‘spillovers’ effects that can reinforce fragmentation and regime integration/ separation 
dynamics (Biermann et al., 2009; Johnson and Urpelainen, 2012). Uncertainty also creates 
opportunities for policy entrepreneurs and new ideas to enter global policy spaces that may set 
governance along new pathways. 
 Alter and Meunier (2009) for instance identify the systemic effects of complexity, such as 
an increase in chessboard politics where states manipulate complexity, for instance through 
forum shifting, but they also create relatively autonomous small group environments because 
states engage in a series of smaller forums instead of a few large universal intergovernmental 
organizations. Abbott and Snidal (2009) treat this as a shift from old governance, which is top 
down, to transnational new governance in which states orchestrate a variety of institutions that 
may be formal or informal, public or private. Jessop and Sum (2006: 267) call this 
metagovernance (setting the rules for other governance bodies) and collibration (working to 
modify the balance of power among them). This is similar as well to the use by Braithwaite and 
Drahos (2000) of the concept of enrolment from actor-network theory, where even weaker actors 
can enhance their power by creating programs that attract adherence from decentralized networks 
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that they do not definitively control. “Orchestration”, “collibration”, and “enrolment” are similar 
concepts in their emphasis on the importance for successful outcomes of strategic engagement 
with a loosely defined set of relatively autonomous zones of governance, rather than reliance on 
rules emanating from a single center of control. However “enrolment” is best suited to the 
identification of opportunities for weak or non-state actors to initiate and benefit from such 
engagement.2   
 This leads to our third proposition: the types of informal mediating governance 
institutions that have proliferated will continue to grow, and the altered balance of power will 
play out through them, rather than undermining them. This development is particularly salient 
for understanding emergent transnational land governance because we suggest that new 
regulatory initiatives are likely to interact and overlap with a wider constellation of regimes and 
clusters of institutions. Those actors that do not recognize the significance of these interactions 
are likely not to respond effectively to the governance opportunities and challenges that 
accompany them.  
 
Strategies for Protecting the Vulnerable 
 
Our analysis leads us to formulate a fourth and more practical proposition: that smaller and 
poorer actors will be most successful in achieving social justice-oriented goals, including the 
revalorization of collective/communal land rights and small-scale agriculture, by working 
through these types of complex transnational governance rather than trying to avoid or reverse 
them, for instance by focusing more exclusively on solutions at the local level or at the formal 
intergovernmental level (for instance through treaties). This view is consistent with research by 
Braithwaite and Drahos (2000), who have proposed a number of ways that weaker actors can 
prevail over stronger actors in transnational governance by making use of its complex and 
normative character, successfully enrolling other actors and networks. Such strategies have 
worked in various governance fields. Take, for instance, transnational advocacy for human rights 
(Keck and Sikking, 1998), access to medicines (Sell and Prakash, 2004), and digital copyright 
(Dobusch and Quack, 2012). Our view is also consistent with research on the experience of 
developing countries in transnational networks by Martinez-Diaz and Woods (2009). Therefore, 
a transnational governance framework is useful to the extent that it can demonstrate how weak 
and strong actors can use formal and informal enrolment strategies to influence decision-making 
at multiple-scales. It is also important to understand dynamics that lead to the 
‘disenfranchisement’ (Fisher and Green, 2006) of weaker actors in transnational governance in 
order to develop strategies to prevent this. These approaches challenges more state-centric and 
rationalist views that would see these complex and fragile networks being undermined by inter-
state conflict, by a decline in the support provided them by US hegemony, ideology, or business, 
or by a resurgence of territorially-based nationalism or regionalism. It also challenges Drezner’s 
(2009, p. 66) more pessimistic view that sees the undermining of formal legal obligations that the 
growth of these informal institutions represent as beneficial to powerful states. 
 
 
Land Grabbing, North-South Relations, and Complexity in Transnational Governance 
 
We now begin to assess the relevance of these propositions for the issue of land grabbing. Land 
grabbing has generated a global debate over whether such large-scale investment in agriculture 
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can promote pro-poor economic growth and sustainable development or whether instead it will 
exacerbate food insecurity, ecological deterioration and political instability in developing 
countries (Cotula et al, 2009; HLPE, 2011). Scholarship has primarily focused on the local and 
national case studies where land grabbing is occurring and how is being resisted. Links to global-
level processes, such as the interplay with the political economy of biofuels, land reform, and 
agricultural restructuring in developing countries (Borras, McMichael and Scoones, 2010; 
Zoomers, 2010) are becoming better understood.  
 Like the other contributors to this volume, our view is that we need to pay more attention 
to the transnational dimensions of land grabbing and its governance. The proliferating literature 
on land grabbing is providing us a clearer view of its scale, location and characteristics albeit 
with big gaps in knowledge related to the lack of transparency and public disclosure of most 
transactions.3 Rather than reproduce those overviews here, we proceed directly to our analysis of 
the three new developments in transnational governance that we discussed above.  
 
Beyond Older Colonial and Hegemonic Power Relations 
 
We suggest the utility of comparing the balance of state power across historical periods to 
highlight the political and economics institutions associated with land grabbing and how such 
institutions have shaped North-South relations. For our purposes, it is important to recognize that 
the current land grab is a massive and growing trend (World, Bank 2009; Anseeuw et al, 2011; 
Oxfam, 2012).4 However, this section will show that despite some similarities with earlier 
periods, current global power relations differ significantly from earlier ones.  
 In the era of colonialism, European sovereign states – Spain, the Netherlands, France and 
Great Britain – were the drivers of the land grab in the pursuit of expanding their national wealth 
and empires. During this period core-periphery relations dominated with imperial powers 
administering social, economic and political exchanges within the colonial territories. Core-
periphery exchanges facilitated the transfer of wealth from colonies to serve the interests of an 
imperial power (Wallerstein, 1974; Hobsbawn, 1987).  
 After World War II the role of land in the developing world began to change. Formal 
colonialism began to disappear and US hegemony became a dominant feature of the global 
political economy (Ruggie, 1982). The US and its allies were not primarily concerned with the 
direct acquisition of land in the Global South. An important exception is the ownership of 
plantations such as those of the United Fruit Company, including the notorious case of CIA 
involvement in the 1954 overthrow of the Guatemalan government when it threatened that firm’s 
interests in that country (Immerman, 1983). However, the general trend during this period was 
towards nationally-oriented agricultural production, which, with the input of imported fertilizer 
and mechanization technology and the orientation to mass national markets corresponded to the 
form of production that has been labeled Fordism (Busch and Bain, 2009; McMichael, 2009). 
Multinational corporations like Cargill and Monsanto dominated agrifood processing and trade 
that resulted but did not focus on direct foreign investment in land. In the socialist East and in 
many developing countries the state would often claim ownership of part or all of the farmland. 
Global institutions relevant to agriculture, such as the food aid regime that assisted in the 
disposal of Northern agricultural surpluses, or the exclusion of agriculture from the General 
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), reflected these overall aspects of the post-World War 
II political economy of agriculture, and the pre-eminent role of the US in organizing it 
(Friedmann, 1992).  
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 Present land grabs are characterized by complex and polycentric relationships that do not 
easily fit a core-periphery framework. Certainly many land grabs do have some characteristics of 
core-periphery relations. For example, Chinese land acquisitions in rural Africa suggest 
significant asymmetries of power and patterns of exploitation very closely resembling core-
periphery relations associated with the era of imperialism given China’s recent ascendency in 
global affairs (see Ayers, 2012). However these do not come with formal colonial control, and 
elsewhere the situation is even more complex. For instance, substantial Chinese land acquisitions 
in rural Australia are not captured well by a core-periphery label. Brazilian investors are major 
players in the purchase of farmland across South America (Borras et al, 2011, p. 24; Dauvergne 
and Neville, 2010) and increasingly in Africa, which is a major target of Brazilian foreign and 
commercial policy (White 2010). This policy of outward investment has strong and active 
support from the Brazilian state because it is increasing its firms profile in the agrifood sector, in 
which it is a global leader. Yet Brazilian land is also a target of foreign commercial interests and 
investment, which has prompted the Brazilian Congress to reform land ownership laws in order 
to curb speculative foreign investment (on ‘land grabbed land grabbers’ see Borras, Franco and 
Wang, 2013, this volume; Perrone, 2013, this volume).  
 During the colonial era land was most often acquired by direct violent means and its legal 
ownership held by the titled monarchs of Europe in perpetuity (and later in common public trusts 
during the emergence of modern nation-states in the former colonies). Contemporary land grabs 
involve negotiated transfer of legal property rights between government or traditional land 
owners to investors. We recognize that the legitimacy and legality of many transactions remain 
deeply contested, that sporadic violence continues to occur and that land grabbing has increased 
the insecurity of many communities. Nevertheless, current land grabs are primarily mediated 
through formal practices (e.g., contracts, memorandum of understanding) sanctioned by the 
governance practices of national and subnational authorities and by transnational economic 
actors that have legal personality (Alden Wily 2012). 
 The political economy of land in the earlier period of US hegemony differs in four 
additional ways from contemporary land acquisitions. First, the sources of capital for foreign 
direct investment in the food-feed-fuel complex are more varied then before, including private 
investors that have not otherwise specialized in agriculture and sovereign wealth funds or state-
owned enterprises from emerging developing countries. Second, current land grabs are taking 
place in the context of a broader shifts in the agrifood industry where deregulated global trade, 
financialization, and advances in biotechnology and production methods are rapidly reorganizing 
the sector, precipitating a decline of the relative power of traditional agrifood corporations such 
as Cargill in favour of retailers such as Walmart and agrifood transnationals from the Global 
South (e.g., Brazil’s JBS now boasts the status as the world largest producer of beef) (Clapp and 
Fuchs, 2009;  Hopewell 2012; McMichael 2012). Third, there is an upswing in interest in direct 
foreign investment in land as a new asset class, notably by new actors such as private and public 
(i.e., national) pension funds estimated to be over $US 5 billion (GRAIN, 2011: 2012). Such 
investment in land relates to its speculative value and the hopes of mitigating risk through its 
‘safe haven’ status (Savills, 2012) and hopes for new sources of profit from biofuels, new 
agricultural technologies, or higher quality branded produce and processed food for which its 
origins and the conditions of its production matter. Fourth, developing countries are actively 
courting and facilitating direct foreign investments after decades of public disinvestment in 
agriculture, reflecting the reorientation of national policy towards a greater emphasis on the 
agricultural sector (see Borras et al forthcoming) . This practice is supported by changes in the 
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global policy and governance terrain such as the new global development paradigm of 
agricultural investment-led poverty reduction that has emerged as a major component of the 
G8/G20’s response to the 2008 global food crisis, such as the L’Aquila Food Security Initiative 
and the Alliance for Food Security and Nutrition and World Bank’s global food security fund 
(Margulis, 2012). 
 Overall then our proposition fits well with contemporary land grabbing. More complex 
sets of relationships are replacing older power relationships between North and South or between 
a US-led capitalist West and state-centric regions elsewhere. 
  
The Ideational, the Material, and the Earth’s Limits 
 
There are numerous ways that land grabbing is related to a new and significant presence of 
material systemic threats to the Earth and its life-forms (see Foley et al., 2005). The search for 
land is driven to a significant degree by concerns that the Earth’s cultivable land is running out 
(Bringenzu et al 2012; Lambin and Meyfroidt, 2011; Harvey and Pilgrim, 2011). The same 
applies to its usable water (Mehta, Veldwisch, and Franco, 2012; Smaller and Mann, 2009; 
Barlow, 2007). In part this is evident in the prominence in land grabbing of those countries 
where land is already scarce or highly degraded, who fear for their own food security, such as the 
Gulf states (Woertz, 2013, this volume). It is also evident in the anticipation of investors with 
long time horizons (such as sovereign wealth funds that run on commercial principles) that land 
prices are going to rise as scarcity increases.5  Climate change, which may seriously damage the 
productivity of existing agricultural land, exacerbates the risks associated with shortages of land. 
The proliferation of ‘green grabs’ are important here as actors invest in land in hopes of slowing 
and/or repairing ecological damage but also in creating global markets for the selling and trading 
of ‘ecosystem services’ (Fairhead, Leach and Scoones, 2012). The prominent place of biofuels as 
a driver of land grabbing reflects the exhaustion of another of the Earth’s resources: fossil fuels 
(see, e.g., Borras, McMichael and Scoones, 2010). This is now an integrated global threat, tied 
together by prices in global markets, and by the use of agriculture to produce energy, which is as 
central to our industrial civilization as food. Struggles likely will intensify between countries 
with dwindling resources and countries with the remaining stocks.  
The materiality of resource scarcities does not make them self-evident. On the contrary, 
both the problem and its solution have crucial contested ideational dimensions that involve far 
more complexity than a more traditional supply of ideas to policymakers by lobbyists or experts. 
For example, the impact of biofuel production on land in Africa can be influenced 
simultaneously by European voter preferences on legislation requiring the use of biofuels in 
vehicles, the calculations of scientists who are assessing the climate change problem and the 
viability of biofuel technologies, the expectations of transnational investors investing in a 
particular plot of land, and the knowledge involved in practical implementation challenges for 
small farmer or agricultural workers growing a new biofuel crop such as jatropha (see, e.g., 
Hunsberger, 2010). This complexity provides a great many locations at which the system driving 
land grabbing can and must be challenged if it is to be altered. In contrast to earlier models of 
international politics where it was easier to address international problems by influencing 
decisionmakers in a few powerful states, or by altering the text of a key treaty, today large 
expanses of the transnational flows of power and knowledge that shape the material practices 
involved in land-grabbing do not run directly through the state at all.     
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 These complex entanglements of ideas and materiality are also evident in the way that the 
signals of scarcity are also mediated through highly imperfect financial markets. Capital and 
financial markets especially are oriented towards the estimation of the present value of a future 
revenue stream (Birchler and Nitzan, 2009). The 2008 financial crisis and the problems of carbon 
trading (Chan, 2009) have starkly revealed the shortcomings of financial markets in trying to 
connect investors to new investment frontiers. Nevertheless promoters of investment in 
farmland, very much like promoters of sub-prime mortgage investments earlier, solicit 
investments by projecting future trends based on contestable measures of past performance. For 
instance Savills, a global real estate services provider, has created a Global Farmland Index, 
which is used to construct a measure for global land prices “showing positive growth in many 
established and emerging markets” (Savills, 2012, p.4). While Savills acknowledges some 
measurement problems in the construction of its index, the overall effect is to obscure the 
severity of these problems and the uncertain political conflicts over land that the future may 
bring. If US subprime mortgages or carbon derivatives are opaque, agricultural contracts in 
Sudan, where law is weak or absent, are worse. The contracts in the current wave of land 
acquisitions primarily promise long-range benefits such as the construction of infrastructure or 
the generation of employment, in exchange for very cheap or even free rights to the land (usually 
in the form of long-term leases). Even some advocates of large-scale land acquisitions, such as 
the World Bank, have found a shocking lack of evidence that these long-run benefits will 
materialize. There are many examples of land being held for its speculative value (e.g. World 
Bank, 2009, p. 45), reducing its current use for agriculture by expropriating those currently 
working the land or by making the land unaffordable to them.   
 The ideational and material interface is also present in the recent structural upward shift 
in food prices. Rising world food prices are not a simple reflection of supply and demand but 
reflect the increasingly complex interplay between actors and ideas across global financial, 
energy and food markets (Clapp and Helleiner, 2012). Developing countries have for decades 
been competing in world food markets under declining terms of trade. The current commodities 
“boom” is widely regarded as an exciting and dynamic conjuncture with perceptions among 
private and public actors of the untapped opportunity and profitability this affords taking on the 
status of conventional economic wisdom (Deutsche Bank, 2009). Land, and the potential to 
overcome the “yield gap” with the incorporation of modern biotechnology, is increasingly 
viewed as an underexploited asset and driving actors to invest in the sector with a clear herd-like 
mentality. Yet is critical that sustainability concerns are almost entirely absent in the new 
enthusiasm for agriculture.  
 Another complex interaction between ideas and materiality is highlighted by the very 
prominent place that transparency plays in the World Bank’s influential report (2009, p. vii, 26) 
on land grabbing:  
‘a major conclusion of the report is that access to a basic set of good information is essential for all 
stakeholders…As long as property rights to land and, where necessary water, are well-defined and a proper 
regulatory framework to prevent externalities is in place, productivity- and welfare-enhancing transactions can occur 
without the need for active intervention by the state.”  
This prioritization of information provision matches the interests of the writers of the report, who 
are advocating more of what they themselves do. Transparency has been promoted as a solution 
to a wide range of governance problems, including in finance (Best, 2005) and the extractive 
sector (Haufler, 2010). However this reliance on transparency is seriously problematic in two 
overlapping ways. First, it advocates reliance on a process of information dissemination which 
obscures the deficiencies of that process itself. These deficiencies include especially the 
9 
 
  
influence of power differentials on what information is produced, who can disseminate it, and 
who can access it. Second, it obscures the significance of material and political practices that 
operate independently of the information dissemination process. The idea of transparency can 
operate like ideology in obscuring, legitimizing, and therefore helping to produce exploitative 
material practices associated with land grabbing. 
 More specifically, the emphasis on transparency obscures the massive asymmetries in 
“voluntary” contracting between large investors, such as sovereign wealth funds, and those at 
risk in the land acquisition, such as someone whose family has engaged in pastoral agriculture 
for generations without formal legal title to the land or any resources to produce or defend such a 
title (Cotula, 2012). There are also gender dimensions to these asymmetries with many land deals 
failing to take the needs and interests, and differentiated consequences of men and women 
(Behrman, Meinzen-Dick and Quisumbing, 2012). Case studies from Sub-Saharan Africa (Chu, 
2011) and Indonesia (Julia and White, 2012) show that were land titles are more often held by 
men than women, even though women make up the disproportionate proportion of the 
agricultural work force, women continue to face significant institutional, legal, and social 
barriers to equal access to land rights. As Borras and Franco (2010, p. 519) emphasize, 
transparency is not the same as accountability; transparency does not ensure transactions are 
accountable to the interest of the rural power.  
 The World Bank report itself provides many examples of outright failures to consult, pro-
forma consultations, or consultations with some stakeholders and not others – particularly with 
men and not the women who are most affected (World Bank, 2009, pp. 49-50). Disclosure 
policies and the framework of prior and informed consent – as compared to more stringent 
regulations – can shift risk towards those who are presently using the land, unfairly legitimizing 
and empowering those with resources who wish to acquire land, and leaving existing exploitative 
market practices intact (Gupta, 2010, pp. 34-35).  
 Despite these problems, the complex interaction of ideas and materiality does not always 
work relentlessly against vulnerable actors. Most present land acquisitions are leases, which 
legally could be terminated if the investor does not follow through on commitments – or even if 
domestic politics changes. Local protests and the transnational support mechanisms for these 
create intangible but materially significant investment risks that provide incentives for foreign 
investors to address the concerns of critics.  
 
The Complexity of Transnational Governance  
 
In this section we will see that the complexity of the transnational governance institutions that 
are addressing land grabbing matches the complexity that we discussed in the previous two 
sections. As noted in our earlier theoretical discussion, this complexity, which trumps the 
shifting balances of power among states, is evident along three axes: by issue area; by the 
varying mix of public and private elements; and by the mix of local and global elements. We also 
discuss here the autonomy of new regulatory instruments for land grabbing and the interaction 
among them and with other governance instruments across scales and issue areas. 
  We start the discussion by examining the two recent transnational instruments that have 
been advanced as new institutions for regulating land grabbing: the Principles for Responsible 
Agricultural Investment that Respects, Livelihoods, and Resources (PRAI) and the Voluntary 
Guidelines on the Responsible Governance of Tenure of Land, Fisheries and Forests in the 
Context of National Food Security (hereafter “Voluntary Guidelines”). Complexity is evident in 
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the differences in the issue areas that they express: the first is more concerned with investment, 
and the second with land tenure. Each instrument is embedded in distinct principles, norms, 
rules, cognitive frames and discourses. The land grabbing phenomena is pulling these two 
regimes, including their rules and constituent actors, into a closer orbit. This process is 
increasing the diversity and density of actors engaged in global rule-making over land. These 
include state and non-state actors that have access to and participate in these and related regimes, 
but which may have not previously operated in the same governance spaces, such as the 
International Planning Committee for Food Sovereignty and the World Bank are now doing at 
the FAO’s Committee on World Food Security (CFS) (McKeon, 2013, this volume).  
 Situating these instruments within an issue area permits us to contextualize the actors, 
interests and ideas in these new global rule-making projects. Recall that it was the G8, not 
investors, that tasked multilateral organizations to develop an international framework for 
responsible investment in agriculture at its 2009 Summit (G8, 2009, p.3; Vidal, 2009). Whereas 
PRAI is often referred to as a form of private governance (i.e., it is intended to provide socially 
responsible investment by private actors), its development has been primarily an exercise of 
consultation and deliberation among experts from international institutions. In fact, 
multistakeholder consultation processes will only start to shape a new framework for responsible 
agriculture investment significantly after several years of work by international public officials.  
The World Bank has demonstrated significant intellectual and organizational leadership 
in the PRAI project. PRAI has been presented by its creators to the outside world as a set of 
evidenced-based codes and best practices assembled to guide and inform decision-making by 
investors (and host states when courting investment in agriculture). The primary objective of the 
PRAI is clear: it is to encourage and intensify private investment in agriculture and to enhance 
the commercial viability of such investments by reducing investor risk. (PRAI, 2010, pp. 2-14). 
It is very much part of the regulate to facilitate camp in the land grabbing governance debate (see 
Borras, Franco and Wang, 2013, this volume). Very importantly, PRAI lacks a normative basis 
for weighing the different type of risks and emphasizes a procedural approach where 
transparency and disclosure are pre-eminent. 
 The second initiative, the Voluntary Guidelines, traces it origins to the 2006 UN 
International Conference on Agrarian Reform and Rural Development (ICARRD) and longer-
term concerns about land tenure and land reform in developing countries (McKeon, 2013, this 
volume; Seufert, 2013, this volume). Multi-actor negotiations, involving states and 
representatives from international institutions, global civil society and the private sector, began 
in April 2011 and completed recently in May 2012. This is an important difference to PRAI 
because global civil society participation has been significant, and has elevated the perceived 
legitimacy of the Voluntary Guidelines. The Voluntary Guidelines, initially endorsed by the 
FAO’s CFS, have been further endorsed and legitimized by the G20 Heads of State, who 
‘encouraged’ its implementation (G20, 2012). Work on the Voluntary Guidelines has shifted 
towards devising a plan for implementation, including mechanisms to monitor and evaluate the 
guidelines, seeking financial support from donors and other multilateral institutions, and 
assisting individual developing countries to codify the Voluntary Guidelines in domestic law and 
practices. In contrast to the investment focus of PRAI, the primary objective of the Voluntary 
Guidelines is to enhance the tenure security of landholders and users, and increase access to land 
and productive resources by poor rural households. In emphasizing its concern with “the benefit 
of all, with an emphasis on vulnerable and marginalized people” it has a more explicit normative 
emphasis than PRAI (FAO, 2010, p. 5). The guidelines resonate with alternative visions of the 
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relationship between the economy, people and the Earth (FAO, 2010, p.13). Unlike PRAI’s 
unquestioned approach of integrating rural farmers with global finance and agrifood chains6, the 
guidelines seek to maintain the viability of smallholder production and autonomy of rural and 
indigenous communities. Global civil society groups and transnational peasant movements 
continue to support the Voluntary Guidelines as an important bulwark against land grabbing 
(Global Witness 2010; Civil Society Mechanism, 2011, p. 4). As such, the Voluntary Guidelines 
were clearly part of a significant norm-generating exercise in transnational governance. The 
diffusion of these norms to the ground-level is the present challenge. 
  A new dimension of complexity has to do with increasing interaction between PRAI and 
the Voluntary Guidelines. As discussed above, each instrument developed in unique way, 
addresses a different issue and has been supported by a different set of actors. Yet increasingly 
these instruments are not independent of one another. First, the final text of the negotiated 
Voluntary Guidelines includes provisions on “responsible investment” and more direct reference 
to large-scale land acquisitions (FAO, 2011, pp. 23-25). Second, there is now a concerted effort 
to bridge the PRAI and Voluntary Guidelines by creating a new set of principles. These 
principles, while taking into account the work to date on PRAI, would be more ‘extensive’. They 
would involve multi-stakeholder negotiation under the auspices of the CFS and ensure that they 
are consistent and complementary with the Voluntary Guidelines (FAO, 2011) Such convergence 
is highly contentious, because global civil society actors see PRAI as a threat to protecting land 
rights of the poor and as a guise for a long-term corporate takeover of rural people's farmlands 
(GCAR, 2010). However, this regime/forum-shifting (Hefler, 2004) of the negotiation of the 
principles to the CFS away from the G8 supported inter-agency process may be regarded as a 
step towards enhancing inclusiveness, participation and legitimacy, and it signals some partial 
success in the orchestration strategy by global civil society. The CFS certainly lends a gloss of 
legitimacy to the idea of PRAI that was previously lacking. This also will put greater pressure on 
global civil society to achieve its ends because it will likely necessitate the greater inclusion of 
private actors. Research has shown that private actors use their technical expertise very 
effectively in the creation of new transnational governance (Haufler, Cutler and Porter, 1999) 
and that this, in turn, intensifies asymmetries in the negotiation process that favours actor with 
higher levels of expertise and material resources (Quack, 2010). 
 Global complexity is also intensified by the overlap between the principles and guidelines 
discussed so far with a broader set of international and regional regulatory frameworks, codes, 
and informal rules at the international, national and sub-national levels. The Voluntary 
Guidelines refer and build upon a variety of other codes, rules, and agreements, including 
ICARRD, international human rights law (e.g., right to food, land, and of indigenous peoples), 
and regional initiatives such the African Union’s recent land policy framework (AU, 2010). With 
respect to global investment rules already in place, these include the OECD’s Policy Framework 
for Investment (PFI), OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises (the MNE Guidelines), 
and the OECD Risk Awareness Tool for MNEs in Weak Governance Zones (WGZ Tool) to 
name a few (OECD 2010). The principles explicitly build on existing codes of conduct and best 
practices. However, actors negotiating the principles at the CFS are not necessarily linked to the 
existing transnational public and private networks that monitor and implement these and other 
finance and investment related governance instruments. It is important to note that the latter 
instruments are not fixed but are themselves quite fluid. Any future ‘principles” are unlikely to 
be wholly determined by the actors formally involved in the negotiation at the CFS on the 
specifics. They will also be indirectly influenced by events and actors at other institutions, such 
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as the OECD and other mechanisms of financial governance. Consequently, this situation 
increases the complexity of the task facing the CFS: to establish meaningful principles that are 
seen as legitimate by investors (which are the primary target of such rules), that can build upon 
existing monitoring systems for investment useful for naming and shaming purposes, and that 
can foster the ‘ratcheting up’ of standards across the investment regime. This is a tall order but 
one that may be less onerous if transnational advocacy groups concerned with land grabbing can 
establish coalitions with other global civil society, institutional actors and sympathetic policy 
elites already active on global investment issues. 
 The complexity of the public-private dimension also plays out in the Voluntary 
Guidelines and PRAI. Take the Voluntary Guidelines, which are focused on land tenure that is 
foremost a national public responsibility, but whose negotiation involved significant input from 
global civil society (and to a much lesser the private sector). The PRAI on the other hand, were 
formulated primarily by supra-national public authorities, but that only have meaning if 
incorporated by investors. PRAI’s vision involves a more prominent role for the private sector 
with private standards and other benchmarks as the building blocs of effective governance. 
Private governance is also evident in other institutions that complement the above two 
instruments. These include certification schemes such as the Roundtable on Sustainable Palm Oil 
or the Roundtable on Sustainable Biofuels (World Bank, 2009, pp. 96-97; see also Fortin and 
Richardson, 2013, this volume), and the UN Global Compact.  
 Indeed, the blurring of the public-private axis is likely to become more pronounced in the 
implementation stage for both these new instruments. Non-state actors such as global civil 
society organizations or private hedge funds also play an important role in influencing the two 
initiatives as they continue to develop, although this influence remains contested. Certainly some 
states continue to strongly assert their sovereignty. As a government official in the Office du 
Niger put it in response to criticisms of land grabbing “We are responsible for developing Mali. 
If the civil society does not agree with the way we are doing it, they can go jump in a lake” 
(MacFarquhar, 2010). Yet as Ruggie (2008) and others have argued, simple state authority is 
increasingly insufficient to legitimize and enable the operations of foreign investors in host 
countries - there is a social license to operate, the terms of which are heavily shaped by local and 
transnational civil society.  
 The interaction between public and private is also evident in the micro-level practices of 
the private contracts between small farmers and larger firms that may rent them their land, 
purchase their crops, and provide inputs or marketing services. These are heavily influenced by 
the existing capacities of the actors involved, the legal regime within which they are operating, 
and the physical characteristics of the plants and machinery involved (World Bank, 2009). A 
similar point can be made about gender relations within the household, which govern the 
differing allocations of individuals’ engagements with the land, the modes of mobility that shape 
their daily and seasonal movement across the land, and their capacities to engage with the legal 
regime that constitutes property rights and contracts, blurring the boundary between a “private” 
household space and a larger public sphere,  
 These micro-level factors also highlight the global/local axis of complexity. Countries 
vary in land ownership and property rights transfer rules. Present land ownership patterns are 
often a result of specific historical patterns and the internal political dynamics of countries. For 
instance, ironically Brazil’s anachronistic constitutional rules may help it control the amount of 
land that can be purchased by foreign companies. In many poor countries of South such capacity 
is weaker, making them vulnerable to asymmetrical power relations. 
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 Struggles between globality and localness are evident at all scales. PRAI’s reference to 
global principles of environmental sustainability (PRAI, 2011, p. 18) only has meaning in its 
implementation at the most local, micro-level, including, for instance, the interaction between the 
roots of a plant and the nutrients of the soil, which can either be sustainable, or a form of “soil-
mining” where the foreign investor takes the nutrients without compensation, destroying the 
land. Virtual water exports where scarce water is exploited in developing countries by exporting 
water-intensive crops is similar (Barlow, 2007). Determining which is occurring and acting on it 
requires an engagement of science with that particular crop, land and farmer. The enforcement of 
the transnational governance instrument therefore requires a chain of capacities, rules and 
practices that interactively link the transnational principles with the farmer and the local 
ecosystem. National institutions are important in this chain, but only one part of it, and not 
necessarily the most decisive one.   
 Land grabbing is also linking states and rural peoples situated at the local to new global 
commercial commodity chains, including the complex mix of investment, trade, and private rules 
that undergird these exchanges. As recent acquisitions suggest, there is a strong economic 
incentive to outsource parts of the food, feed and biofuel production process. This has to do with  
shifting the burden of costs of production to poor developing countries were wages are cheaper, 
land is “underutilized” (often claimed falsely by governments and investors to be so), and where 
environmental governance and enforcement is weak. Much of this facilitated by international, 
bilateral and regional investment and trade agreements as well as economic cooperation 
partnerships.  
 To sum up, new regulation of land is linked across multiple governance regimes at the 
transnational, regional, national, and local levels. The governance of land grabbing certainly 
cannot be reduced to PRAI or the Voluntary Guidelines. Conflicts reveal characteristics of 
chessboard politics that were discussed earlier. Non-state actors such as multilateral institutions 
and global civil society are also maneuvering in this political chessboard. PRAI and the 
Voluntary Guidelines rest upon multiple clusters of governance practices, all of which operate 
under of the authority of diverse and distant configurations of state and non-state actors. They go 
far beyond the simpler shift in the balance of power signified by the replacement of the G8 by 
the G20, or the decline in US dominance. While newly powerful states such as China and the 
Gulf states may be less attentive to these complex set of transnational institutions, they too must 
work through them to some degree, especially in needing to interact with host states and other 
local actors that in turn are connected in complex was to the transnational institutions.  
    
Strategies for Protecting the Vulnerable 
 
Our fourth proposition was that that smaller and poorer actors will be most successful working 
through the types of complexity we have discussed above and enrolling transnational actors and 
networks in efforts to change governance rather than trying to avoid or reverse complexity by 
focusing more exclusively on solutions at the local level or at the formal intergovernmental level 
(for instance through treaties). There is already some support in the discussion above for this: the 
sheer complexity of the challenges makes it impossible for any one actor to manage them. No 
single formal intergovernmental organization can manage this complexity either. Treaties are 
simply too slow.  
 There are three main additional reasons why local responses alone will not work. First, 
by avoiding transnational engagements important economic and social benefits may be lost. 
14 
 
  
Chronic poverty, food insecurity, limited access to credit and technology, ecological constraints 
and political disfranchisement are serious challenges facing many of the world’s rural poor. 
Economic globalization increases the pressures on these populations as demand for natural 
resources and agricultural output intensifies, intensifying what Sassen (2010: Sassen, 2013, this 
volume) refers to as the ‘savage sorting of losers’. At the same time, it is important to keep in 
mind that urbanization and transitioning of the rural poor from a global majority to minority may 
in the long-term further diminish their political voice. These are very real challenges for the 
formulation of socially just land governance. These larger forces suggest the importance for rural 
people and their advocates to develop bottom-up ‘best practices’, that reflect the needs, 
knowledge, and aspirations of existing land users, but that also can engage and enroll other 
powerful transnational actors and steer projects towards relatively more beneficial forms that 
respect existing land arrangements.   
 Second, transnational developments will continue to impinge on the local, even if strong 
local prohibitions on land grabbing were in place. This includes climate change and the 
destruction of water sources far from the local farm. Third, local power relations may be even 
more unfavourable to poor users of land than transnational ones. This includes gender relations 
in the family, local authorities that do not listen to their constituents, and national states that 
serve the interests of urban skilled elites. For instance in northern Argentina, local states 
officials, landowning elites, and foreign investors have clear-cut over 60,000 hectares for 
soybean production destined for China. This has occurred in an area where rural communities 
have earned their livelihoods by small-scale sheep herding on customary used land. Large-scale 
land deals between the Ethiopian state and foreign investors are producing high tech mega-farms, 
including the acquisition by the Indian firm Karuturi Global of 300,000 hectares. Media reports 
local workers earn income below the extreme poverty threshold and, more recently, allegations 
of forced evictions, murder and rape of villagers have surfaced concerning this deal (Bloomberg 
News, 2009). The World Bank’s own research suggests that much of the land grabbing is being 
carried out by domestic investors, often with privileged access to the state (Deininger et al, 
2011). Even though this claim is not fully supported by all studies, it provides a reminder that the 
shocking lack of transparency in the documentation and accountability mechanisms for 
investment is not only due to lack of state capacity in host countries, but also officials’ desires to 
be unaccountable.  
 There are significant opportunities for the poorest farmers to obtain greater protection if 
the various elements in the transnational arrangements that might be helpful to them are 
successfully orchestrated. The efforts by global civil society and peasant organizations to support 
the Voluntary Guidelines and subsume PRAI is one example. Firms reliant on financial and 
product markets in democracies can be held accountable through a variety of mechanisms, 
including public regulation, private litigation, reputational damage to their brand, and organized 
protests. International campaigns and consumer boycotts against blood diamonds, use of 
sweatshop labour, or cooperation with authoritarian regimes have shifted private actors’ 
perceptions of the importance of responsible behaviour to safeguard reputations and profits. New 
scientific studies have challenged the purported benefits of biofuels. The fragility and 
interdependence of the financial system amplifies the risks that investors face in engaging in land 
grabbing and make them more vulnerable to transnational pressures.  
 These varied types of responses to the problem of land grabbing have less impact on 
authoritarian countries, but those countries too have reputational costs that they must consider. 
For instance in 2013 the Gulf states must act with great care in addressing their citizens’ 
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demands lest they lose vital support from the US. Even China consented to the rapid referral of 
the Libyan case to the International Criminal Court, indicating its sensitivity to certain 
international responses to problems of local violence. In conflicts with the US over exchange 
rates and other matters vital to China, its human rights reputation, at home and abroad, plays a 
role in the alliances with the US and others that it can sustain, or even its access to foreign 
investment opportunities in countries like Canada. Much Chinese investment is through 
sovereign wealth funds that are operating sufficiently on market principles so that losses from 
disruptions or reputational damage to the value of the agricultural assets that they hold will be 
unwelcome.     
 
Conclusion 
 
Our first three propositions argued that the land-grab illustrates three key changes in the global 
political economy: changing balance of power and decreasing relevance of framing global 
relations around either East-West or North-South axes; the direct interaction between ideas and 
material systemic threats; and the complexity of transnational governance. Our fourth 
proposition argued that these complex transnational institutions can be helpful for protecting the 
poorest users of the land. We address these in turn. 
 First, it is clear that the balance of power has changed. The case of land grabbing does 
not correspond to earlier cases of North-South conflicts dominated by the European colonial 
powers or the US. Southern states are major players, as investors, in protecting or abusing their 
own populations, and in negotiating strong or weak international rules. This introduces more 
complex dynamics into the transnational political process: Southern states are not “victims” 
seeking to rebuff the North. Rather, human beings in certain parts of the South are being 
victimized by a plurality of actors: by states and investors from the South and North but also by 
local elites. Traditional concepts of South-South solidarity or other traditional forms of inter-
state political conflict are therefore less relevant to understanding the type of global politics of 
land grabbing. 
 Second, the global character of the interaction between ideas and material systemic 
threats to the Earth and its life-forms is evident in land grabbing. Much of the transnational 
politics associated with land grabbing can obscure and complicate the broader ecological clash 
that is at play. This is in part because the two key transnational governance instruments have 
been developed under the guidance of the G8/G20, a club of powerful states, and the FAO, a 
food and agriculture policy institution with universal memberships and with a long history of 
deep engagement with non-state actors, and a concern with growing production. The process has 
not engaged the climate change regime, which in any case is a relatively new and weak regime. 
We, like others, view the land grab as part of a wider transformation of the relationship between 
people and the Earth as much as it is about organizing economies and polities. Agriculture is a 
major source of greenhouse gas emissions and ecosystem degradation, and also the solution to 
the current risk that the planet cannot support its human population. Since the vulnerable are the 
most susceptible yet also the least resourced to respond to the destruction of ecosystems and 
climate change risks, and since agriculture is asked to sustain the life of the world’s population 
that does not live on the land, the environmental/ecological aspects of governance will be critical 
going forward. The interactions of scientific knowledge and ideas about the environment with 
material practices, many of which do not directly involve states, will be important in this. We 
recognize this aspect will be highly contested by actors; this is already evident in current policy 
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debates on agroecology, smart agriculture and ecosystem services as approaches to address the 
ecological crisis, most notably in the case of green grabs.  
 Third, it is clear that the interaction of land grabbing with the complexity of transnational 
governance highlights the significance of each of these for the other. This complexity is evident 
in the way that the land grab involves new relations between food, fuel, feed and finance that 
expose communities of persons, which have historically been the most exploited and least able to 
benefit from the process of wealth generation in the global economy, to ever greater systemic 
and personal risks. This includes risk to their material wellbeing (i.e., livelihoods by loss of land) 
but also the security of persons when rural people are faced with forced evictions and violence. 
In the context of a global economy mediated by the belief in price signals, mechanisms are 
required to the shift the burden of risk more squarely onto the shoulders of investors, who 
presently often reap most of the rewards, and who are better capitalized to absorb such risks 
compared to the rural poor.  
 Fourth, the complexity of the problem requires complex solutions. Local, national or 
transnational solutions alone cannot be effective. Nor can purely public or purely private 
solutions, nor solutions that focus on one issue such as efficiency or investor protection at the 
expense of the human right to food or the protection of the Earth’s ecosystems. Thus all three 
axes of complexity that we have identified are important. In seeking to defend the rights of poor 
people threatened by land grabbing it is helpful to work with, expand, strengthen, and alter 
complex transnational linkages, rather than to try to reduce or cut them. No single governance 
initiative by itself can be effective. Notions such as chessboard politics, enrolment, and the 
highlighting of linkages of land regulation to relatively autonomous and distant governance and 
knowledge practices and flows of power are useful in conceptualizing strategic responses to this 
complexity.         
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